Proxy Voting is Intrinsically Disordered

Kimo Gandall

Professional Registered Parliamentarian

"… proxy voting is incompatible with the essential characteristics of a deliberative assembly…" RONR (12th ed.), 45:70.

As the April convention of the California Republican Party (CRP) convention approaches, a heated debate has emerged as to the use of proxies. In the context of the CRP, this allows a single delegate to hold multiple votes, thereby allowing candidates or measures to reach a majority even if the actual, in person majority is clearly at odds with the proposal. Some claim that proxies constitute a manipulation of democracy, others that proxy vote harvesting is a legitimate tactic of democracy. On the national stage, proxy voting has been used by Democrat lawmakers, who constitute 72% of the total proxy votes, to participate in Black Lives Matter protests, campaign, and effectively, ignore important Congressional debates. Not only does this decay the already abysmal trust in Congress, but it reinforces a polarized view of politics, one in which votes are decided before debates and debate is simply a pretext for the next election cycle. 

Opponents of proxies further point out localized abuse in California. As many delegates have noticed, CRP elections and disputes are often handled by a truly “secret majority,” which unlike a silent majority is not only absent from debate, but the actual meeting. High stakes proxy farming conducted by highly paid consultants thus come to domineer over the regular membership. 

Proxies, however, are not only an incidental evil. As I will argue, the use of proxies are intrinsically disordered. Proxies, while technically legal under the CRP Bylaws, are at odds with the general parliamentary law. Proxies are at odds with nature. And thus, proxies are at odds with our inalienable rights offered by nature’s creator, God. As a result it quickly becomes obvious that proxy voting is intrinsically disordered in a democracy.(1)

For this reason, I urge all CRP delegates to vote in favor of Bylaw proposal #3 or #7, whichever comes first, which will in effect eliminate proxies. 

First, from an academic lens, proxies are mutually exclusive with a proper, functional deliberative assembly. To understand functionality, we must first review the actual rights of membership. In terms of the convention, CRP Bylaws, §1.02 define membership as composed of delegates.(2) RONR (12th ed.), 1:4, likewise, defines the rights of members: 

1. The right to attend meetings; 
2. The right to make motions; 
3. The right to speak in debate; 
4. The right to vote.

These rights, moreover, are not “dead” but require an analysis, both textually and in practice, to understand their meaning. Indeed, RONR (12th ed.), 1:4 recognizes that there are “rights concomitant to them” such as the “right to make nominations” or “to give previous notice.” 

To interpret these rights there are effectively two realms of procedural authority. As I have written in the National Parliamentarian:(3)

​For our purposes here I will also differentiate two requirements to parliamentary law: the rules of something and the nature (customs) of something. The rules are the explicitly enumerated text; that is, an assembly’s bylaws, standing rules, special rules, parliamentary hand manual, etc.(4) In contrast, the nature of something is its custom, and the custom of something is a function of the objectives of that thing and the uncoded means of that thing.(5) As such, in order to accomplish an end, good customs of that thing are needed to ‘fill in the blanks’ where the rules do not fit. Under this definition, a subtype of custom is discretion by an officer to the enforceability of rules; that is, to maintain rules that protect rights and avoid those that are only technical in character.(6)

​Thus, to properly understand how proxies interfere with a deliberative assembly, we must understand both written rules and effects of those rules. 

Returning to the CRP, we can now see how proxy voting is at odds with the actual text and intended effect of the text. Proxy voting is simply “a power of attorney given by one person to another to vote in his stead.” RONR (12th ed.), 45:70. Thus, a proxy transfers all rights of membership to another person. However, “ordinarily [proxy voting] should neither be allowed nor required, because proxy voting is incompatible with the essential characteristics of a deliberative assembly in which membership is individual, personal, and nontransferable.” RONR (12th ed.), 45:70. Thus, proxies violate the basic, textual principle that membership is individual. 

Second, because textualism is often unconvincing on its own, one should also note why proxies are philosophically at odds with member rights. To name a few:

1. The right to attend meetings. Even during the civil war, RONR prohibited meetings that were not in person. What constitutes, then, in person? RONR is clear: “the meetings provide, at a minimum, conditions of opportunity for simultaneous aural communication among all participants.” RONR (12th ed.), 9:31. This is the same rule that governs electronic meetings, and in doing so, effectively prohibits them: “the business of an organization… can be validly transacted only at regular or properly called meetings- that is… a single official gathering in one room or area.” RONR (12th ed), 9:30. Only if electronic meetings are authorized by the bylaws can they sufficiently pass this textual requirement of being in-person, and even then, it must meet the principle of equal participation. Proxies necessarily violate this, as they offer other members a superior opportunity to be present, from the most extreme circumstances, such as holding more votes in disciplinary hearings, to the mundane motions of ending debate. In practice, it is even worse: the CRP bylaws, §2.02.03(B)(3) inserts a temporal requirement, effectively nullifying the right of a member who offered a proxy to rescind it after a certain period. In effect, that member is denied the possible right of attendance. If proxies remain in the CRP, there is little to demarcate the principle prohibiting electronic and requiring in-person meetings. 
2. The right to make motions. The effect of motions is particularly worrisome. For one, the requirement of a second is in effect nullified, as a member holding a proxy holds the rights of that proxy, and thus can second his own motion. Furthermore, how can a member be properly recognized, if the principle of recognizing only one member at a time is to be respected? Even if these were too academic a point, there numerous other procedural problems a proxy could create. To name a few:
   • Reconsideration. Normally, reconsideration can only occur with a member on the prevailing side, in effect mitigating the possibility of the opposition reconsidering every vote. But with proxies, one could always cast his votes both ways, and thus force reconsideration every time. 
   • Discipline. It is a fundamental rule of parliamentary procedure that members have a right to due process in disciplinary proceedings: “If thus accused, he has a right to due process…” RONR (12th ed.), 63:5. This includes the right to be treated fairly, i.e. impartially. To do so, RONR requires that the accused “must leave the room” after closing arguments. RONR (12th ed.), 63:33. This impartially is at odds with proxy voting if the accused’s proxy, who holds a right to attend the meeting, is allowed to participate. It would also then allow, in effect, the accused to vote on his own charge. If the CRP, as it alleges in both its explicit deference to RONR and its implied reverence to the fourteen amendment under CRP Bylaw §1.04.01, truly cares about due process, then proxies ought to be eliminated. 
   • Voting on delegate lists. If an appeal is made to a delegate report in a political convention, those delegates can be excluded from the initial list. This allows the assembly to impartially debate on admitting delegates. But proxies could create a situation where a delegate who is excluded by himself is invited to debate on behalf of his proxy, eliminating the impartiality of the assembly. For the same reason listed above, this violates the delegate’s fundamental right to due process. 
3. The right to speak in debate. This is perhaps the most problematic. Before standing rules are adopted, each member can speak twice, with each speech at a maximum of ten minutes for a total of twenty minutes. If one holds two proxies, he can now speak a total of six times, for a total of an entire hour! And if he offers an amendment, this requirement resets. While the CRP Bylaws offer the (equally troublesome) ability of the Chair to ignore dilatory attempts to obstruct the assembly, the parliamentary rules allow him to simply appeal the Chair’s ruling, again resetting the speaking times. Even if the individual was not intending to obstruct the committee, his additional speaking time violates the principle of equal participation, thereby allowing him more time to make his case than other members. 
4. The Right to Vote. RONR (12th ed.), 45:2 makes a very explicit case against proxies (emphasis added): 

It is a fundamental principle of parliamentary law that each person who is a member of a deliberative assembly is entitled to one—and only one—vote on a question… For example, in a convention, a person selected as a delegate by more than one constituent body may cast only one vote. An individual member’s right to vote may not be transferred to another person (for example, by use of proxies). 

​
​If members are not equal, then the entire philosophical precepts behind voting falls apart. 

For these reasons, proxies violate both the explicit text of the law and intended ends of the law. They are thus not only bad in practice, but intrinsically disordered. In an organization that truly represents the people, it cannot be allowed to continue.

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1. Robert’s Rules will be consulted for this analysis, as it is the parliamentary handmanual of choice for the CRP. See: CRP Bylaws, §3.10: “The rules contained in the current edition of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised shall govern the California Republican Party in all cases to which they are applicable…”
2. CRP Bylaws, §1.02: “The Committee consists of the delegate membership (or delegation) meeting in convention from time to time…”​
3. Kimo Gandall, A Treatise of Parliamentary Law: A Call for a Paradigm Shift, 81 National Parliamentarian 18–23 (2020).
4. RONR (11th ed.), pp. 12 - 8.
5. RONR (11th ed.), p. 19: “... particular practice may sometimes come to be followed as a matter of established custom so that it is treated practically as if it were prescribed by a rule.” If one concurs that rules must adhere to the objective, and if customs are to be treated as rules, they are then differentiated by their uncoded nature. Of course, this has the weakness of enforcement but the latter doesn’t actually undermine the custom’s truth value.
6. RONR (11th ed.), pp. 250, 456 ll. 9 - 15; 13 - 5.